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There is common consensus that managerial compensation is strongly
tied to rm size and much less so to nancial performance One sus 
pects that observed restructuring and downsizing in corporations in
recent years may have an eect on these results Based on multi task
theoretical considerations our evidence for German industrial rms
shows that pay for rm size elasticities decrease only for large rms as
they change their strategy from growth to downsizing strategies Fur 
thermore pay for performance elasticities are contrary to predictions
of agency theory Both results provide further support to the com 
mon belief that compensation contracts in public corporations seem
imperfectly tied to rm performance and managers tasks
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Managerial compensation has gained much attention across many disciplines
and seems to be one of only a few examples of successful interdisciplinary
research In an extensive survey of the literature GomezMejia  reviews
about  published empirical studies covering diverse 	elds such as eco
nomics 	nance accounting human resource management organizational
behavior sociology and psychology One of the core results of many empiri
cal studies is the low pay for 	nancial performance sensitivity and the high
pay for 	rm size sensitivity These results seem to be very robust across dif
ferent national samples measures and estimation techniques However most
studies are crosssection studies or consider only very short time periods and
therefore provide no evidence on whether or not the seemingly robust results
are transitory Signi	cant structural change either stochastic or intended
may weaken or strengthen the results
Only a few studies considered the stability of relationships between ex
ecutive compensation performance and 	rm size over time One is Kostiuk
 
 who studied two time periods   and    and concluded that
the paysize elasticity is relatively stable for American executives Baker
Jensen and Murphy   show that the elasticity of American CEO compensa
tion with respect to 	rm sales within the period   has been remarkably
stable across time and industries with the mean and median elasticity equal
  whereby twothirds of the estimates fall in the range of 
 to 
On the other hand using a small sample of US companies Boschen and
Smith  studied the intertemporal response of pay to 	rm performance for
the period   They found that compensation schemes have shifted
toward greater performance sensitivity over time with stronger longterm
eects They therefore conclude  that the payperformance relationship
has a signi	cant longrun component and is incompletely characterized by its
contemporaneousonly relationship p  Similarly Joskow and Rose
  observed an increase in pay for performance sensitivity during the  s
by analyzing data for   CEOs in  	rms between   However
they also emphasized that the performance eect on compensation does not
have a signi	cant longrun component it appears to decay substantially over
two to three years In contrast Jensen and Murphy  by comparing CEO
payperformance sensitivity in   versus   observed that it has
fallen by a factor of   over the past  years p 

This paper intends to analyze the stability of compensation related to the
determinants 	rm size and performance in German manufacturing compa
nies The data set contains information from  	rms for the period of  
to   During this time period German 	rms have gone through distinc


tive phases of restructuring as a reaction of actual or anticipated changes in
external environments The management of strategic change involves a series
of distinct steps which include incentives for managers to transform the 	rm
from the present state to the future state to maximize shareholders wealth
We assume that managerial compensation in terms of 	nancial incentives
depends on the speci	c task of restructuring and should be reected in es
timates of 	rm size and performance elasticities Therefore intertemporal
shifts of incentive pay should be the result of strategic change of managers
tasks
German manufacturing 	rms have gone through distinct phases of strate
gic change since the  s As is illustrated in Schwalbach   the period
  to about   shows signi	cant 	rm growth while thereafter consolida
tion and downsizing dominated Firm growth was realized in the  s and
s due to internal growth via vertical integration and horizontal diversi	ca
tion In the  s growth was performed due to mergers and acquisitions and
led to diversi	cation into related and unrelated 	elds In the  s exter
nal diversi	cation continued but 	rms started to concentrate their activities
around their core business In the late  s and  s 	rms divested un
related businesses globalized and outsourced activities According to this
development one 	nds three distinct phases of strategic change growth
  consolidation    and downsizing since about  
Assuming potential conict of interest between shareholders and man
agers we expect that managerial incentives depend on the type of restructur
ing task Conventional compensation packages in German 	rms consisting
of high base salaries low accountingbased bonuses and no stock ownership
provide eective incentives for diversi	cation size and growth but not for
adopting strategies of consolidation and downsizing If shareholders are
aware of the eectiveness of incentives one expects that compensation pack
ages are tied closer to shareholders wealth particularly in phases of consol
idation and downsizing If compensation packages are incentive compatible
we expect trends of increasing payperformance elasticities and decreasing
pay	rm size elasticities across business activity phases
Although there is ample evidence that compensation is tied to 	rm size
and growth there is virtually no study which looks explicitly at the eect of
restructuring and downsizing on executive pay Press reports usually pro
vide extreme examples about pay and downsizing like the case of British Gas
where the CEO Cedric H Brown was awarded a  percent pay increase in
  while at the same time the company was further downsized by 

employees  By now it is evident that many 	rms went or are going through
 See Business Week July  	 p	

a phase of downsizing Statistics show that   million jobs were eliminated
in the American industrial sector between   and  In Germany one
estimates about two million jobs lost during the period of  
 The
evidence about downsizing challenges the widely accepted result of strong
size and weak performance eects on managerial compensation In a de
tailed case study about General Dynamics Corporation Dial and Murphy
  demonstrate that compensation tied to shareholders wealth create in
centives to increase shareholder value even in industries where downsizing
opens substantial opportunities for value creation And more recently the
  survey by Business Week showed increasing pay for performance sensi
tivity which is in part explained by stronger performance related incentives
in periods of restructuring Furthermore Dechow Huson and Sloan  show
that compensation is adjusted for restructuring charges to ensure that exec
utives have the incentive to pursue valueenhancing strategies during phases
of restructuring and downsizing
The paper is structured as follows In the next section we develop the
hypothesis on the basis of agency theory The speci	cation of the empirical
model is provided in section  followed by the data description Section 
presents the results and conclusions are given in the last section
 Theory and Hypothesis
Agency theory is applied to situations of modern corporations where share
holders the principal delegate work to managers the agents An agency
problem arises if managers do not direct their work to serve the interests of
shareholders Managers can pursue conicting goals if they can hide informa
tion so that the shareholders cannot perfectly observe whether managers ac
tions will increase shareholders wealth To avoid the agency problem theory
predicts that compensation contracts can be designed to provide managers
incentives to take actions which increase shareholders wealth
Holmstrom and Milgrom  proved that a simple linear compensation
function of the kind CP   a  bP would have the desirable incentives to
behave in principals interest whereas a serves as a 	xed and b as the incen
tive component depending on 	rm performance P  Empirical estimates of
the incentive parameter b show low values of elasticities of around   
for the US about  for Germany and about  
 for Japan There
See Business Week April 
	  pp	
See Rosen 	 for a review of the US results Schwalbach and Grassho  for
Germany and Kato and Rockel  for Japan Further evidence is reported in Barkema
Geroski and Schwalbach 


is disagreement about the desired magnitude of incentives or as Rosen  
states it  what is not so clear from theory is what a reasonable bench
mark would be Is the    elasticity estimate too small or too large
The theory has not focused enough on that number to provide an answer 
p 
 
Holmstrom and Milgrom  provide an answer to that open question by
arguing that incentives provided should depend on the multitask activities
of executives Speci	cally they recommend considering the full portfolio of
activities before predicting the strength of incentives applied to any given
performance measure since some dimensions of performance can lead to
myopic behavior For example weak incentives invite executives to favor
	rm growth and size If risktaking due to downsizing is wanted incentives
have to be stronger to minimize disincentives for downsizing
Agency theory predicts that high 	xed payments provide incentives to
pursue growth strategies even if they create excess capacity and are not
warranted by the capital market Conventional compensation contracts in
clude high 	xed payment and therefore do not provide adequate incentives
for downsizing In practice 	rm size and industry eects are the dominant
determinants of pay levels In German 	rms about  percent of total com
pensation is variable and about   percent has longterm eects on average
This means that  percent of compensation is shortterm oriented whereas
 percent is unrelated to shortterm 	rm performance Stock ownership by
executives although allowed by German company law Aktiengesetz does
not play a role in managerial compensation at all
Managerial compensation tied to 	rm size and shortrun accounting prof
its is misleading if the task is to pursue restructuring and downsizing strate
gies Downsizing involves exit from market segments associated with sales
of plants or business units and plant closure Furthermore it requires laying
o employees and increases restructuring charges thereby aecting current
accounting pro	ts It is obvious to see that incentives for restructuring and
downsizing have to reect longrun eects and measures which reect the
market value of the 	rm while growth strategies can also reect shortrun
and accounting performance measures
For German 	rms we identi	ed three distinct phases of speci	c restruc
turing strategies growth consolidation and downsizing We assume that
managerial incentives are set in accordance with the required activities Con
centrating on measures of 	rm size and 	rm performance as determinants of
executive compensation we expect that parameter estimates should vary
Recently companies like DaimlerBenz and Deutsche Bank are in the process of nding
ways to reward executives with stock options

across time and strategy Before predicting the magnitude of parameter
estimates one should take into account the interrelationship between pay
performance sensitivity and 	rm size
Agency theory predicts that 	rm size and pay sensitivity are inversely
related This is shown by supposing the aforementioned linear compensation
function Ct  at  bVt where Vt is the 	rm value in period t at is the
	xed salary and b the share of 	rm value or incentive component Then
Ct  at  bVt  at  bVtrt where rt is the rate of return and a is a
time trend which usually is assumed to be constant Incentives are assumed
to be set optimally if bVt  const  then b is inversely proportional to 	rm
size Rosen   expects based on the results of Jensen and Murphy 
that standard linear regressions underestimate the average payperformance
sensitivity by a factor of almost   He therefore recommends semielasticity
estimates of the kind dlogcompensationdr for better control for size eects
And Holmstrom  prefers regressions like Ct  at  bVtSt where St is the
size of the 	rm In any case both would like to see more empirical work
identifying what the sizepay sensitivity relationship exactly is
Combining singletask with multitask agency theoretical considerations
provides us with the tools to predict the magnitude of parameter estimates
in regressions on managerial compensation We expect that compensation
contracts are task speci	c Since task may change over time compensation
contracts should change accordingly Restructuring strategies of growth con
solidation and downsizing are distinct from each other and incentives for ex
ecutives have to be adjusted to them Conventional compensation contracts
as mentioned above provide incentives for sales or asset growth and 	rm
size In contrast incentives for downsizing strategies have to be stronger and
tied closer to the market value of the 	rm Given the linear compensation
function Ct j  t j  jPt j  jSt j where the index j stands for the strate
gies j    for growth j  
 for consolidation and j   for downsizing
strategies we expect that incentive parameter  the 	rm size parameter 
and 	xed payment  depend on strategy j  Speci	cally we assume that
            and       which means that incentives
should be strongest and 	xed payment be lowest during phases of downsiz
ing The size eect should be strongest in period of growth Due to imperfect
measurement we expect variation of parameters within strategy period j but
levels across j should be dierent than was predicted
See Jensen and Murphy  for empirical evidence and Holmstrom  for theoretical
explanation Schaefer  provides both theoretical and empirical evidence

 Model Specication
We follow the suggestion by Rosen   and adopt for dierent time groups
dierent strategies j     
  the following models
lnCit j  j  t jZt j  jPit   j  j lnSit   j  	it j  
for all i        N and t  
     T  Index j reects the 	rms strategy as
speci	ed in the previous section If j   the model reects contempo
raneous compensation response independent of strategy In all other cases
parameters are assumed to reect speci	c compensation schemes for growth
j    periods      consolidation j  
 periods      and
downsizing j   periods        strategies For given j        
Zt j is a dummy variable with value one if time point t belongs to the time
group representing strategie j and zero otherwise
The model assumes that the level of compensation Cit j at 	rm i in time
t is a semiloglinear function of performance Pit j and a log linear function
of 	rm size Sit j in the previous period t   The sensitivity parameters are
j and j whereas t j are time deviation eects from the constant terms j
within strategie time group j The stochastic error terms are represented
by 	it j The impact of the size eect is studied by using this model and
splitting the 	rm sample in two parts representing small and large 	rms
For j    
  this leads to a 	xedeect model of the kind
lnCit j  t j  


S j Xit j Dit j  


L j Xit j    Dit j 

i        N  t  
     Tj where abbreviated Xit j    Pit   j lnSit   j

The dummy variables Dit j are de	ned as
Dit j 
 
  for Sit   j  medianSit   j
 for otherwise




L j  L j L j L j

The models include time deviation eects t j with the parametrizationP
t j   Estimations for the parameter values are computed by OLS
routines imposing this restriction for each j Based on the estimation results
the hypotheses  j       Tj  j   are tested by FTests In order to detect
dierences between small and large 	rms we compute additional Fstatistics
for the hypotheses 
S j  
L j for each j    
  Finally we will see
whether there are dierences between the dierent time groups strategies












The data set consists of  German industrial stock companies Aktienge
sellschaften for which annual information is available for the period   to
  Annual executive compensation is known only for the management
board as a whole German company law requires neither individual compen
sation levels nor their components to be reported Therefore compensation
can only be measured as average per capita income for the members of the
management board Vorstande in 	rm i and year t In our sample incomes
vary between  and  German Marks at the beginning of the
time series in   and between  and   German Marks in
  across 	rms The annual growth rate of compensation was on average
 percent If one compares the average annual per capita income for the
management board in our 	rm sample  German Marks with the
larger Kienbaum sample consisting of  German industrial 	rms 
German Marks in   one observes that our sample is biased toward 	rms
with higher income levels
As 	rm performance measures we use Tobins q market valuebook
value and rate of return on stocks alternatively Firm size is measured
as the number of employees and sales The smallest 	rm in our sample em
ployed 

 persons and the largest 	rm   persons in   In the same
year sales varied between 
 Mio and  Billion German Marks
 Results
Simple crosssection regressions of model   for each year reveal that the
estimated parameters shift considerably over time The coecient of the
constant term t uctuates the least and shows a clear positive trend The
incentive parameter t uctuates within the range of   until the
year   and levels o thereafter However most of the coecients are
statistically not signi	cant The 	rm size parameter t varies between  
and 
 and shows a positive trend until the year    and drops signi	
cantly thereafter This leads us to the 	rst result that incentive and 	rm
size parameters are remarkably unstable across time but show a medium to
longterm trend which indicates that contemporaneous characterizations of
compensation functions are incomplete
Tables   to  summarize the results of 	xed eects regression models  
and 
 The data rejects the hypothesis of zero time deviation eects over
We are grateful to the Science Center Berlin for providing some of the data
See Kienbaum Vergutungsberatung   Vergutung 	 Gummersbach

the full time horizon j   The computed value of the Fstatistic leads
to a rejection of the hypothesis that         T     Furthermore
the periods   representing growth strategy j    and   rep
resenting consolidation strategy j  
 are statistically dierent while the
period    representing the downsizing strategy j   are not statis
tically indistinguishable from the consolidation period Additionally Ftests
reveal that the hypotheses of equal values of parameter estimates between
small and large 	rms are rejected within strategies which indicates persistent
size eects
Individual parameter estimates illustrated in Tables   to  can be inter
preted as follows Estimates for the time series as a whole are in line with
the widely observed result that pay for performance elasticities are much
smaller than pay for 	rm size elasticities see Table   last columns Specif
ically a one percentage point increase of the rate of return on stocks would
eect compensation by an increase of about  percent And a one percent
increase of 	rm sales increases compensation by about 
 percent
Parameter estimates change as one looks at strategy periods Concen
trating 	rst on Table   pay for 	rm size elasticities remain about constant
as one moves from growth to downsizing strategies which does not support
our hypothesis that the commonly observed strong 	rm size eect can only
be found for the pursuit of growth strategies During periods of consolida
tion and in particular during downsizing management is not rewarded by
reducing the 	rm size In contrast pay for performance eects are dierent
We observe in Table   estimates which point to the opposite of our hypothe
ses Incentives are strongest during phases of growth and are weakest during
downsizing This is contrary to what agency theory recommends
Turning to Tables 
 and  one observes remarkable dierences between
small and large 	rms Pay for 	rm size elasticities do not vary as much across
strategies in large 	rms but are on average higher in small 	rms Interest
ingly pay for 	rm sales elasticities drop during periods of downsizing only
in large 	rms This indicates that the management of small 	rms have less
pressure to strategic change due to narrow diversi	ed product portfolios and
therefore reward management to keep the 	rm relatively small In addition
pay for performance elasticities in small 	rms are generally higher than in
large 	rms but are still in contrary to theoretical predictions but less so than
in large 	rms Over time the eects of incentive pay in large 	rms disappear
completely and indicate that managers in large 	rms are paid a 	xed salary
without any or only marginal incentive schemes

 Conclusions
Agency theory predicts that incentives to managers should be task speci	c
Since tasks may change over time compensation contracts change accord
ingly Incentives should be stronger the more riskaverse managers are and
the more risky the task will be
Standard principalagent models and previous empirical studies did not
consider the multitask issue of management We have identi	ed three dis
tinct tasks and estimated parameters for a standard loglinear compensation
function Based on a data set consisting of German industrial corporations
we 	nd that incentives are set contrary to theoretical predictions Although
small 	rms deviate less from theory than large 	rms it still supports the
common consensus that compensation contracts in public corporations seem
imperfectly tied to 	rm performance and managers tasks
The remarkable dierence between small and large 	rms in particular in
periods of downsizing suggests that strategic changes in large 	rms are more
signi	cant than in small 	rms In addition the results seem to support the
aforementioned theoretical predictions by Holmstrom and Milgrom  If
managers performance can only be measured incompletely the optimal in
centive contract can be to pay a 	xed salary Since tasks for managers in
large 	rms have more dimensions than in small 	rms it is more dicult to
measure performance in large 	rms This may explain why pay for perfor
mance elasticities in large 	rms are much lower than standard principalagent
theory predicts
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Table 1: Results of Model (1)
Dependent Variable: LN(COMP)
Periods 1969-1979 1980-1990 1991-1994 1969-1994 Periods 1969-1979 1980-1990 1991-1994 1969-1994
CONST 3,2679* 3,8565* 4,1459* 3,6725* CONST 3,5249* 3,8118* 4,3538* 3,7731*
(0,0950) (0,0734) (0,1492) (0,0557) (0,1137) (0,0815) (0,1187) (0,0584) 
LN(EMPL) 0,2185* 0,2521* 0,2527* 0,2391* LN(EMPL) 0,2171* 0,2508* 0,2404* 0,2353*
(0,0098) (0,0079) (0,0143) (0,0058) (0,0103) (0,0079) (0,0145) (0,0059)
TOBQ 0,2393* 0,0431* 0,0939* 0,1103* STOCKS 0,0791 0,1014* 0,0366 0,0795*
(0,0328) (0,0215) (0,0400) (0,0170) (0,0638) (0,0443) (0,0547) (0,0311) 
N 528 528 192 1248 N 528 528 192 1248
R2 0,55 0,70 0,63 0,73 R2 0,50 0,70 0,62 0,72
Periods 1969-1979 1980-1990 1991-1994 1969-1994 Periods 1969-1979 1980-1990 1991-1994 1969-1994
CONST 3,8767* 4,4034* 4,5911* 4,2279* CONST 4,0060* 4,3456* 4,7687* 4,2808*
(0,0622) (0,0535) (0,1123) (0,0386) (0,0814) (0,0638) (0,0878) (0,0430) 
LN(SALES) 0,2211* 0,2367* 0,2397* 0,2318* LN(SALES) 0,2243* 0,2357* 0,2305* 0,2299*
(0,0081) (0,0067) (0,0119) (0,0048) (0,0084) (0,0066) (0,0121) (0,0048) 
TOBQ 0,1784* 0,0350 0,0888* 0,0867* STOCKS 0,0918 0,0986* 0,0235 0,0744*
(0,0295) (0,0200) (0,0363) (0,0154) (0,0564) (0,0412) (0,0501) (0,0280) 
N 528 528 192 1248 N 528 528 192 1248
R2 0,64 0,74 0,69 0,78 R2 0,61 0,74 0,69 0,77
Standard errors in parentheses
* denotes significance at 5% level
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Table 2: Results of Model (2)
Performance Measure: Tobin's q
Dependent Variable: LN(COMP)
Periods 1969-1979 1980-1990 1991-1994 1969-1994 Periods 1969-1979 1980-1990 1991-1994 1969-1994
CONST_S 3,9529* 3,3064* 3,4461* 3,4504* CONST_S 3,5106* 3,9161* 3,9101* 3,8945*
(0,2539) (0,1815) (0,3034) (0,1382) (0,1344) (0,1130) (0,2082) (0,0761) 
CONST_L 3,5372* 4,1351* 4,6339* 3,9423* CONST_L 4,0636* 4,6668* 5,1368* 4,5144*
(0,1984) (0,1570) (0,2864) (0,1165) (0,1283) (0,1084) (0,2190) (0,0770) 
LN(EMPL_S) 0,0911* 0,3100* 0,3302* 0,2443* LN(SALES_S) 0,2848* 0,3207* 0,3488* 0,2769*
(0,0365) (0,0267) (0,0430) (0,0200) (0,0326) (0,0233) (0,0370) (0,0163) 
LN(EMPL_L) 0,2113* 0,2339* 0,2212* 0,2269* LN(SALES_L) 0,2187* 0,2128* 0,1940* 0,2107*
(0,0197) (0,0155) (0,0264) (0,0114) (0,0162) (0,0123) (0,0214) (0,0088) 
TOBQ_S 0,3572* 0,1583* 0,2016* 0,2355* TOBQ_S 0,2498* 0,0929* 0,1564* 0,1711*
(0,0424) (0,0333) (0,0541) (0,0242) (0,0402) (0,0320) (0,0489) (0,0226) 
TOBQ_L 0,1060* -0,0346 -0,0428 0,0013 TOBQ_L 0,0478 -0,0207 -0,0288 -0,0019
(0,0482) (0,0262) (0,0565) (0,0224) (0,0439) (0,0243) (0,0516) (0,0202)
SSE 66,039 47,315 18,472 137,710 SSE 54,090 40,936 15,092 112,923
N 528 528 192 1248 N 528 528 192 1248
R2 0,57 0,72 0,66 0,74 R2 0,65 0,76 0,72 0,79
Standard errors in parentheses
* denotes significance at 5% level
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Table 3: Results of Model (2)
Performance Measure:
Rate of Return on Stocks
Dependent Variable: LN(COMP)
Periods 1969-1979 1980-1990 1991-1994 1969-1994 Periods 1969-1979 1980-1990 1991-1994 1969-1994
CONST_S 4,2771* 3,2950* 3,6503* 3,6230* CONST_S 3,5297* 3,8269* 4,0062* 3,8852*
(0,2787) (0,1945) (0,3209) (0,1481) (0,1570) (0,1309) (0,2359) (0,0904)
CONST_L 3,4557* 3,9773* 4,5266* 3,8730* CONST_L 3,9497* 4,5230* 5,0442* 4,4406*
(0,2289) (0,1656) (0,2506) (0,1181) (0,1495) (0,1178) (0,1683) (0,0773)
LN(EMPL_S) 0,1131* 0,3197* 0,3323* 0,2565* LN(SALES_S) 0,3489* 0,3364* 0,3571* 0,3087*
(0,0388) (0,0271) (0,0445) (0,0207) (0,0321) (0,0227) (0,0379) (0,0161)
LN(EMPL_L) 0,2139* 0,2371* 0,2218* 0,2252* LN(SALES_L) 0,2201* 0,2157* 0,1952* 0,2092*
(0,0210) (0,0157) (0,0284) (0,0118) (0,0167) (0,0123) (0,0211) (0,0090)
STOCKS_S 0,0288 0,1546* 0,1219 0,0840 STOCKS_S 0,0560 0,1307* 0,1194 0,1018*
(0,0736) (0,0677) (0,1140) (0,0460) (0,0641) (0,0637) (0,1112) (0,0426)
STOCKS_L 0,1883* 0,0672 0,0319 0,0777* STOCKS_L 0,1604 0,0766 0,0322 0,0725*
(0,0948) (0,0518) (0,0639) (0,0380) (0,0841) (0,0471) (0,0548) (0,0333)
SSE 75,144 49,040 19,786 147,659 SSE 57,813 41,213 15,835 117,370
N 528 528 192 1248 N 528 528 192 1248
R2 0,51 0,71 0,64 0,72 R2 0,62 0,75 0,71 0,78
Standard errors in parentheses
*  denotes significance at 5% level
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